David Ebrey's Dissertation
(Copyright by David Ebrey, 2007)
Complete text of dissertation as pdf: DavidEbreyDissertation.pdf
Complete text of dissertation as doc (Greek should appear correctly on a Mac): DavidEbreyDissertation.doc
Chapter 1: EbreyChapter1.doc
Chapter 2:EbreyChapter2.doc
Chapter 3:Ebreychapter3.doc
Chapter 4: EbreyChapter4.doc
Abstract:
The heart of this dissertation is an interpretation of matter in Aristotle. I argue that in order to understand what matter is for Aristotle we need to appreciate his reasons for making matter central to his natural philosophy. There is an extensive literature on matter, supporting many incompatible interpretations. Looking at Aristotle’s reasons for giving matter a prominent role allows us to resolve this tension by determining what features are crucial to matter. On the reading I offer here, Aristotle makes matter central to his natural philosophy because something is needed in order to be able to understand change. Specifically, what is needed is something that, properly speaking, (i.e., per se) undergoes change. Matter is not a separate thing in the universe; to call something matter is to pick it out in terms of this fundamental role in change.
After introducing this interpretation in the first chapter, the second chapter argues for it through a close reading of Aristotle’s Physics I. The most crucial passages appear in the midst of a complicated discussion that is often misread: Physics I.5 to I.7. Aristotle portrays himself in I.7 as solving a problem as to whether the principles of nature are two or three. Understanding this problem, I claim, is the key to understanding the crucial passages in Physics I.5-7.
The third chapter develops and defends the interpretation by clarifying matter’s role in change through a study of Aristotle’s use of the term “enhuparchein.” When used in connection with matter, this term is normally thought to support rival interpretations, according to which matter is a constituent of the product of a change. I offer an alternative reading according to which Aristotle uses “enhuparchein” to tell us that matter is an internal cause of change, rather than an external one.
The final chapter
examines how Aristotle’s account of matter differs from analogues to
matter found in his predecessors’ natural philosophies. I first argue
that Aristotle does not think that any of his predecessors truly
understand matter. Then, I examine how and why two of Plato’s analogues
to matter are different than Aristotelian matter.
Table of Contents:
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
The Basic Proposal 1
The Sheer Replacement Motivation 18
Chapter 2: Finding Aristotle’s Motivation for Matter in Physics I 30
Introduction
30
The Search for Principles of Nature 35
The Tension between Physics I.5 and I.6 38
The general-conditions tension 39
The from-what tension 43
The Two versus Three Puzzle 55
Structure of Physics I.7 59
The first half of I.7: 189b30-190b17 62
The second half of I.7: 190b17-191a22 68
Aristotle’s account of matter 70
Countable and more of a this thing here 72
What things come to be from per se 75
Chapter 3: Matter as an Internal Cause 97
Introduction 97
The Ross-Waterlow Interpretation 101
Matter as an Internal Cause, Internal Principle, and Element 103
Adjudicating between the Readings 111
Physics I.8: the lack as not something which enhuparchei 113
Physics I.9: matter as something which enhuparchei 122
What does it Mean that Matter Enhuparchei? 126
Appendix: Aristotle’s different uses of “enhuparchein” 129
Chapter 4: Precursors of and Obstacles to Aristotelian Matter 135
Aristotle Categorizing his Predecessors: a Poor Understanding of Matter 136
Phaedo 149
Timaeus 161
Why bring in the receptacle? 164
What is the receptacle? How and why is it different than matter? 169
Works Cited 178